Introduction 1
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) were originally intended as legal instruments to promote and protect investments from rich capital exporting states to the developing world. While BITs signed between developing countries (hereinafter South-South BITs) did begin to emerge from the mid-1960s with the 1964 Kuwait-Iraq BIT, the typical BIT was until recently negotiated between a developed and a developing country (hereinafter North-South BITs). Accompanied by rising outward foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks from developing countries, however, this pattern has begun to change as many developing countries have increasingly entered into BITs among themselves. have typically failed to ensure that their more narrow scope is not potentially "levelled out" by the treaties' most-favoured-nation ("MFN") provisions. This is somewhat perplexing, and based on interview feedback from BIT-negotiators, I conclude by speculating whether this de facto coherence in developing countries' BIT-networks might be unintended.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section briefly discusses the methodology applied in the analysis, as it departs substantially from the traditional legal literature investigating BITs. The second section introduces the national treatment standard and reviews whether South-South BITs have been more likely to restrict or completely exclude the standard compared to North-South BITs. The third section introduces BITs' transfer 5 UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 47. 6 Further details can be found in the full paper; see supra note 1.
clauses and reviews whether South-South BITs have been more likely to allow restrictions to foreign investors' repatriation of funds. The fourth section reviews whether the differences are 'leveled out' by the treaties' MFN provisions and discusses the implications of the results. The final section concludes.
Methodology
The literature investigating the content of BITs can generally be divided into two strength or flexibility for development. This has been tried elsewhere. 13 But while not necessarily an illegitimate exercise, this would involve major and ultimately subjective assumptions on the role of different provisions which would be more than problematic for most purposes, including this analysis.
National Treatment
The first standard included in the analysis is that of national treatment (NT). 24 While a formal distinction can be made between "reservations" and "exceptions," I use these terms interchangeably along with the term limitations. See generally Newcombe and Paradell, supra note 14, ch. 10. 25 E.g. 1982 Belize-United Kingdom BIT, article 3. 26 E.g. 1996 Barbados-Canada BIT, article 11. 27 E.g. 1995 Nicaragua-US BIT, article 2.
Table 1
Purely aspirational NT clauses are few and distributed more or less equally across the two BIT-dyads. A greater share of North-South BITs has NT clauses with specific exceptions, but this is almost solely driven by U.S. and Canadian treaties which include exceptions to their NT provisions for the pre-and post-establishment phases. The major difference, however, is that more than one-third of South-South BITs does not include an NT provision at all compared to only 8 percent of North-South BITs. This means that only 12 percent of North-South BITs exclude or limit their NT provisions as defined above, whereas the share is 46 percent for South-South BITs. The confidence intervals for the two groups don't overlap, and the difference is therefore unlikely to be due to random variation in the sample. It thus seems that South-South BITs have indeed been much less likely to incorporate wide-ranging NT clauses compared to North-South BITs. This conclusion is interesting and relevant in and by itself. By basing the analysis on a large and representative sample of treaties, the table above gives a much clearer picture of rulemaking patterns in the international investment regime than the traditional cursory and non-systematic reviews.
An additional question, however, is whether the pattern is due to the differences in BITpartners, or it instead reflects some other underlying factors. For apart from whether the One option is to subject the transfer clause to domestic laws, in which case the host state is free to limit the flow of capital out of its economy during economic crises as long as it is done through law. 34 Another option is to allow exceptions to the free transfer of funds, but only during balance-of-payments difficulties and typically with a requirement that such restrictions should be necessary, non-discriminatory and on a temporary basis. . * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Repatriation of investment-related funds Share
analysis above but this time group BITs with direct restrictions in their transfer clauses with BITs, which include exceptions to national security interests could be allowed. Table 5 Table 5 shows that North-South BITs have in fact been more likely to include security exceptions, but the share of BITs with a security exception that covers the transfer provision is more or less similar between the two types of BIT-dyads (and the difference is not statistically significant). The overall conclusion therefore remains the same. For while a little more than half the sample's South-South BITs incorporate a security exception that covers the transfer provision and/or include restrictions to the transfer clause, only around a quarter of North-South BITs do so. Accordingly, it is not surprising, that while the estimates did become lower in the logistic regressions after also considering security exceptions, the differences are still substantial across all three specifications and significant in two out of three (table 6) 
Security exceptions Share
* Include balance-of-payments restrictions as well as other major restrictions such as subjecting the clause to domestic laws. Where does this leave us? On the one hand, the conclusion may imply that while many past differences with respect to foreign investment protection between developed and developing countries have been overcome, one should perhaps not overstate the degree of consensus purely based on the fact that South-South BITs are proliferating. If so, then the popularity of South-South BITs cannot, in and of itself, be used as an argument that a multilateral treaty on investment is more feasible today than it was ten years ago.
Alternatively, the systematic differences should perhaps not be taken as an indicator of developing countries' collective interests in the international investment regime. Instead, it could simply be that demands in BIT-negotiations between developing countries have been more easily accommodated, not because they are necessarily thought to be prudent by both the contracting parties but simply because negotiators may not consider the BIT The analysis has thus far been based on the treaty texts alone and therefore not taken into account MFN provisions. As a general rule, MFN-provisions operate in BITs according to all matters falling within the scope of the treaty. 53 Whether the ejusdem generis principle implies that the clause only covers substantive provisions is unclear from existing case-law. 54 Neither is it clear whether the clause only allows an investor to invoke provisions from other investment treaties which are 'compatible in principle', and if so what that means in terms of limiting its application. 55 What is clear, however, is that cases decided so far have generally allowed a contracting party to 'import' substantive provisions from other BITs entered into by the other contracting party. In Bayindir v.
Pakistan, for instance, the tribunal held that the MFN provision allowed the investor to
Republic the tribunal argued that the investor could rely on an expropriation provision from another BIT to determine the standard of compensation. 57 Arguably, this implies that even if a South-South BIT does not include an NT provision, for instance, the MFN clause may oblige the parties to extend NT nevertheless, as long as they have included NT in at least one other BIT. BITs and, as such, the level of rationality we as observers should assume about the BITmaking process. While I am currently undertaking such a research project, these explanations remain provisional and somewhat speculative for now and must therefore be subject to further investigation. 
Conclusion

Explanatory variables
My explanatory variable of interest is a dummy variable indicating whether the BIT-dyad is between two developing countries or not. The host state's level of development is controlled for by including the natural log of its GDP per capita income, and its level of incoming investment by the natural log of its inward FDI stock. I control for its political environment by including a dummy variable for whether it has a socialist legal tradition (typically former or current Communist countries) and two variables indicating whether it had a leftwing and/or a nationalist government in the year it signed the BIT. 71 I moreover include a dummy variable for whether the host state is from Latin America (the 'home region' of the Calvo doctrine) and similarly include dummy variables to capture systematic tendencies in the BIT-networks of the 10 countries with the largest number of BITs signed at the end of the period. 72 As a measure of the economic integration between the BIT partners I include a variable measuring their bilateral trade flows as a share of the host state's GDP, and finally I include a dummy for whether the BIT has been signed after 2000
to capture possible time-effects. A summary of the covariates (excluding the country and period dummies) is given in the table below. 71 In sensitivity analysis, various indexes attempting to measure the investment climate of the host state were included as well. This reduced the observations by almost one third, and because the indexes were generally not significant in any of the estimations. 72 Due to the undersampling of Italian BITs, Italy is not included as a dummy. but ultimately related, estimation challenges. 75 If the different specifications all lead to the same conclusions, this would naturally increase our trust in the robustness of the results (and vice-versa).
